تدریس

dsf

fff2222

تدریس تکنیکهای زبان ت پنجشنبه ۲۹ شهریور ۰۳ | ۱۱:۰۳ ۷ بازديد


amplify
augment, deepen شدت یا عمق بخشیدن
abject despicable, servile

پست، خفیف، رقت انگیز

alleviate
abate, relieve کاهیدن، تسکین دادن
admonish counsel, reprove

سرزنش کردن، انتقاد کردن

abate
moderate, decrease کاستن، کم شدن
adherent follower, disciple

تابع، پیرو

abound
flourish, proliferate فراوان بودن، وفور داشتن
awkward rude, blundering

سخت و زحمت دار، معذب کننده

abortive
vain, unproductive بی ثمر

abolish
abrogate, annul

ملغی کردن
allay pacify, soothe

تلطیف کردن، نرم کردن

alien
foreigner, outsider بیگانه
acumen awareness, brilliance

تیزهوشی، فراست

authentic
accurate, credible موثق، معتبر
accord agreement, harmony

آکورد، هماهنگی، هارمونی

adhere
comply, observe قبول و پیروی کردن
axiom adage, truism

حقیقت آشکار، اصل

arraign
incriminate, indict احضار کردن
audacity boldness, courage

بی پروایی، جرئت

ascend
climb, escalate بالا رفتن
adversity misfortune, calamity

بدبختی، فلاکت

adamant
stubborn, inflexible یک دنده، غیرمنعطف
acrimony harshness, bitterness

تندی، شدت

adjunct
joined, added الحاقی، ضمیمه
abash disconcert, rattle

دستپاچه یا شرمنده کردن

abjure
forsake, renounce عهد شکستن، برائت جستن
allure entice, fascinate

جذب کردن، شیفتن
کلمات مترادف انگلیسی که با حرف B شروع میشود


کلمه اصلی مترادف انگلیسی معنی
busy active, engaged

مشغول، درگیر

bustle
commotion, tumult شلوغی، هیاهو
brittle breakable, crisp

شکننده

bold
adventurous بی باک، جسورانه، ماجراجو
boisterous clamorous, rowdy

پرسروصدا (معمولا به شکل منفی)

blunt
dull, insensitive کرخت، بی حس
bleak grim, austere

پوچ، غم انگیز

bind
predicament بدبختی، شرایط سخت
bewitching alluring, charming

خوش آمدنی، افسونگر

benign
favorable, friendly دوست داشتنی، نیکو
benevolent benign, generous

نیک سرشت، خوب

befogged
becloud, dim مبهم، مختل
bawdy erotic, coarse

اروتیک

batty
insane, silly احمق، دیوانه
base vulgar, coarse

ناهنجار

barrier
barricade, obstacle مانع
barren desolate, sterile

بی ثمر، تهی

baroque
florid, gilt باروک، دارای طلاکاری و گلگون
barbarous frustrate, perplex

وحشی، گیج و بهت زده

baffle
astound, faze

مبهوت کردن
بیشتر بخوانید:کلمات متضاد انگلیسی
کلمات مترادف انگلیسی که با حرف C شروع میشود
کلمه اصلی مترادف انگلیسی معنی
comic clown, jester

دلقک، مضحک، خنده دار

consequence
effect, outcome پیامد
compassion kindness. Sympathy

همدلی، همدردی

creation
formation, foundation ایجاد، پایه، شکل گیری
cunning acute, smart

زیرک، حقه باز، باهوش

contrary
dissimilar, conflicting مغایر، مخالف
captivate beguile, bewitch

اسیر کردن، افسون کردن

catholic
generic, liberal لیبرال، روشن فکر
cease terminate, desist

متوقف کردن

consent
agree, permit موافقت کردن، اجازه دادن
cement plaster, mortar

گچ، سیمان

conceit
egotism, immodesty خودرایی، غرور، خودپسندی
comprise include, contain

شامل شدن، تشکیل شده بودن از

callous
obdurate, unfeeling سنگدل، بی عاطفه
consolidate centralize, fortify

یکپارچه کردن، محکم ساختن

celebrated
acclaimed, lionized ستوده، مشهور
calm harmonious, unruffled

آرام، هماهنگ

cheap
competitive, inexpensive ارزان
chastise

punish, admonish


تنبیه کردن، مجازات کردن

slave برده

تدریس تکنیکهای زبان ت چهارشنبه ۲۸ شهریور ۰۳ | ۲۱:۳۹ ۸ بازديد

کشتی به گل نشسته strand

تدریس تکنیکهای زبان ت چهارشنبه ۲۸ شهریور ۰۳ | ۲۱:۰۴ ۴ بازديد

dgf3343

تدریس تکنیکهای زبان ت چهارشنبه ۲۸ شهریور ۰۳ | ۲۰:۵۸ ۹ بازديد
 
 
 
 
 
41
The cost of living is certainly higher in urban areas, but by a factor of 1.2-1.5 rather than by a factor
of 2. Thus the urban self-rated poverty line is, in real terms, higher than its rural counterpart. Why?
• One possibility is that there is more inequality in the urban areas, and that this raises expectations.
• Another plausible explanation is that households in urban areas may have more exposure to the
media, and may have been affected more thoroughly by consumerism.
• A third explanation is that urban households may be more attuned to political processes, and their
estimates of the poverty line may include an element of strategic behavior ñ trying to influence
policy makers.
Self-rated measures of poverty are rarely collected. If the Filipino experience is at all
representative, it is clear that they cannot usefully supplant the more traditional ìobjectiveî measures of
poverty.
 
 
42
CHAPTER 4
Measures of Poverty
What does Aggregate Poverty Measure? Given information on (say) per capita consumption, and
a poverty line, then the only remaining problem is deciding on an appropriate summary measure of
aggregate poverty. There are a number of aggregate measures of poverty that can be computed.
4.1 Headcount index
By far the most widely-used measure is the headcount index, which simply measures the
proportion of the population that is counted as poor, often denoted by P0. Formally,
(4.1) ¦ =≤= =
N
i
p
i N
N
zyI
N
P 1
0 ,)(
1
where N is the total population and I(.) is an indicator function that takes on a value of 1 if the bracketed
expression is true, and 0 otherwise. So if expenditure (yi) is less than the poverty line (z), then I(.) equals
to 1 and the household would be counted as poor. Np is the total number of the poor.
The great virtue of the headcount index is that it is simple to construct and easy to understand.
These are important qualities. However the measure has at least three weaknesses:
The headcount index does not take the intensity of poverty into account. Consider the following two
income distributions:
Headcount Poverty Rates in A and B, assuming poverty line of 125
Expenditure for each individual in
country
Headcount poverty
rate (P 0)
Expenditure in country A 100 100 150 150 50%
Expenditure in country B 124 124 150 150 50%
Clearly there is greater poverty in country A, but the headcount index does not capture this.
As a welfare function, the headcount index violates the transfer principle ñ an idea first formulated by
Dalton (1920) that states that transfers from a richer to a poorer person should improve the measure of
welfare. Here if a somewhat poor household were to give to a very poor household, the headcount
index would be unchanged, even though it is reasonable to suppose that poverty overall has lessened.
The headcount index implies that there is a ìjumpî in welfare, at about the poverty line, so it is
meaningful to speak of the poor and the non-poor. In practice, such a jump is not found (Ravallion
1996, p.1330).
• The head-count index does not indicate how poor the poor are, and, hence, does not change if people
below the poverty line become poorer. Moreover, the easiest way to reduce the headcount index is to
target benefits to people just below the poverty line, because they are the ones who are cheapest to
move across the line. But by most normative standards, people just below the poverty line are the
least deserving of the poor. Thus, despite its popularity, many problems result from an undue
concentration on the head-count statistic.
 
 
43
• It is also important to note that the poverty estimates should be calculated for individuals and not
households. What we calculate using the head-count index is the percentage of individuals who are
poor and not the percentage of households. To be able to do so, we make a critical assumption that
all household members enjoy the same level of well-being. This assumption may not hold in many
situations. For example, some elderly members of a household may be much poorer than other
members of the same household. In reality, not all consumption is evenly shared across household
members.
4.2 Poverty gap index
A moderately popular measure of poverty is the poverty gap index, which adds up the extent to
which individuals fall below the poverty line (if they do), and expresses it as a percentage of the poverty
line. More specifically, define the poverty gap (Gn) as the poverty line (z) less actual income (yi) for poor
individuals; the gap is considered to be zero for everyone else. Using the index function, we have
(4.2) ).().( zyIyzG iin ≤−=
Then the poverty gap index (P1) may be written as
(4.3) ¦= =
N
i
n
z
G
N
P 1
1 .
1
This measure is the mean proportionate poverty gap in the population (where the non-poor have
zero poverty gap). Some people think of this measure as the cost of eliminating poverty (relative to the
poverty line), because it shows how much would have to be transferred to the poor to bring their incomes
(or expenditure) up to the poverty line. The minimum cost of eliminating poverty using targeted transfers
is simply the sum of all the poverty gaps in a population; every gap is filled up to the poverty line.
However this interpretation is only reasonable if the transfers could be made perfectly efficiently, for
instance with lump sum transfers, which is implausible. Clearly this assumes that the policymaker has a
lot of information; one should not be surprised to find that a very ìpro-poorî government would need to
spend far more than this in the name of poverty reduction.
At the other extreme, one can consider the maximum cost of eliminating poverty, assuming that
the policymaker knows nothing about who is poor and who is not. From the form of the index, it can be
seen that the ratio of the minimum cost of eliminating poverty with perfect targeting (i.e. Gn) to the
maximum cost with no targeting (i.e. z, which would involve providing everyone with enough to ensure
they are not below the poverty line) is simply the poverty gap index. Thus this measure is an indicator of
the potential saving to the poverty alleviation budget from targeting.
The poverty gap measure has the virtue that it does not imply that there is a discontinuity
(ìjumpî) at the poverty line. Yet a serious shortcoming of this measure is that it may not convincingly
capture differences in the severity of poverty amongst the poor. For example, consider two distributions
of consumption for four person; the A distribution is (1,2,3,4) and the B is (2,2,2,4). For a poverty line
z=3 (so that the headcount index is 0.75 in both cases), A and B have the same value for the poverty gap
index (i.e. 0.25). However, the poorest person in A has only half the consumption of the poorest in B.
One can think of B as being generated from A by a transfer from the least poor of the poor persons (the
individual with ë3í in A) to the poorest. The poverty gap will be unaffected by such a transfer. Its main
drawback is that it ignores inequality among the poor. To see this, consider the following example:
 
 
44
Poverty Gap Poverty Rates in A and B, assuming poverty line of 125
Expenditure for each individual in country Poverty gap rate (P 1)
Expenditure in country A 100 100 150 150 0.10
Expenditure in country B 80 120 150 150 0.10
For both of these countries, the poverty gap rate is 0.10, but most people would argue that country B has
more serious poverty because it has an extremely poor member.
To summarize, the Poverty Gap Index is the average over all people, of the gaps between poor
peopleís standard of living and the poverty line, expressed as a ratio to the poverty line. The aggregate
poverty gap shows the cost of eliminating poverty by making perfectly targeted transfers to the poor (i.e.,
closing all poverty gaps), in the absence of transactions costs and disincentive effects. This is clearly
unrealistic but it does convey useful information about the minimum scale of the financial resources
needed to tackle the poverty problem. Moreover, the poverty gap index can show the value of using
survey information to learn about the characteristics of the poor. A costly way of eliminating poverty
would be to make completely untargeted poverty line-sized transfers to everyone in the population. The
poverty gap index gives the ratio of the cost of eliminating poverty using perfectly targeted transfers
compared with using completely untargeted transfers. Thus, the smaller is the poverty gap index, the
greater the potential economies for a poverty alleviation budget from identifying the characteristics of the
poor so as to target benefits and programs.
4.3 Squared poverty gap index
To solve the problem of inequality among the poor, some researchers use the squared poverty gap
index. This is simply a weighted sum of poverty gaps (as a proportion of the poverty line), where the
weights are the proportionate poverty gaps themselves; a poverty gap of (say) 10% of the poverty line is
given a weight of 10% while one of 50% is given a weight of 50%; this is in contrast with the poverty gap
index, where they are weighted equally. Hence, by squaring the poverty gap index, the measure
implicitly puts more weight on observations that fall well below the poverty line. Formally:
(4.4) .)(
1
1
2
2 ¦=
=
N
i
n
z
G
N
P
The measure lacks intuitive appeal, because it is not easy to interpret and so it is not used very
widely. It may be thought of as one of a family of measures proposed by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke
(1984), which may be written as
(4.5) ¦ ¸¸
¹
·
¨¨
©
§
= =
N
i
n
z
G
N
P 1
1
α
α , (α ≥ 0)
where α is a measure of the sensitivity of the index to poverty and the poverty line is z, the value of
expenditure per capita for the j-th personís household is xj, and the poverty gap for individual j is Gj=z-
xj(with Gj=0 when xj>z) When parameter
α=0, P0 is simply the head-count index. When α=1, the index is
the poverty gap index P1, and when
α is set equal to 2, P2 is the poverty severity index. For all α > 0, the
measure is strictly decreasing in the living standard of the poor (the lower your standard of living, the
poorer you are deemed to be). Furthermore, for
α > 1 it also has the property that the increase in
measured poverty due to a fall in oneís standard of living will be deemed greater the poorer one is. The
 
 
45
measure is then said to be "strictly convex" in incomes (and "weakly convex" for
α=1). Another
convenient feature of the FGT class of poverty measures is that they can be disaggregated for population
sub-groups and the contribution of each sub-group to national poverty can be calculated.
The work by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke provides an elegant unifying framework for measures
of poverty. However it begs the question of what the best value of α. Some of these measures also lack
emotional appeal.
The measures of depth and severity of poverty provide complementary information on the
incidence of poverty. It might be the case that some groups have a high poverty incidence but low
poverty gap (when numerous members are just below the poverty line), while other groups have a low
poverty incidence but a high poverty gap for those who are poor (when relatively few members are below
the poverty line but with extremely low levels of consumption). Table 4.1 provides an example from
Madagascar. According to the headcount, unskilled workers show the third highest poverty rate, while
the group is in the fifth rank according to the poverty severity. Comparing them with the herders shows
that they have a higher risk of being in poverty, but that the poverty tends to be less sever or deep. The
types of interventions needed to help the two groups are therefore likely to be different.
Table 4.1: Poverty Indices By sub-groups, Madagascar, 1994
Head count: % Rank Poverty gap: % Rank Poverty severity: % Rank
Small farmers 81.6 1 41.0 1 24.6 1
Large farmers 77.0 2 34.6 2 19.0 2
Unskilled workers 62.7 3 25.5 4 14.0 5
Herders/fishermen 51.4 4 27.9 3 16.1 3
Retirees/handicapped 50.6 5 23.6 5 14.1 4
Source: Coudouel, Hentschel and Wodon (2001)
4.4 Sen Index.
Sen (1976) proposed an index that sought to combine the effects of the number of poor,
the depth of their poverty, and the distribution of poverty within the group. The index is given
by
(4.6) ),)1(1(0 z
GPP
P
P
s
µ
−−=
where P0 is the headcount index, µP is the mean income (or expenditure) of the poor, and GP is the Gini
coefficient of inequality among the poor. The Gini coefficient ranges from 0 (perfect equality) to 1
(perfect inequality), and is discussed further below in the context of measuring inequality. The Sen Index
can also be written as the average of the headcount and poverty gap measures weighted by the Gini
coefficient of the poor, giving:
(4.7) )1(10
PP
s GPGPP −+=
The Sen index has been widely discussed, and has the virtue of taking the income distribution
among the poor into account. However the index lacks intuitive appeal, and cannot be decomposed
satisfactorily into its constituent components, which explains why it is rarely used in practice.
 
 
46
4.5 The Sen-Shorrocks-Thon index.
The Sen index has been modified by others, and perhaps the most compelling version is the Sen-
Shorrocks-Thon (SST) index, defined as
(4.8) )à1(10
PP
SST GPPP += ,
which is the product of the headcount index, the poverty gap index (applied to the poor only), and a term
with the Gini coefficient of the poverty gap ratios (i.e. of the Gnís). This Gini coefficient typically is
close to 1, indicating great inequality in the incidence of poverty gaps.
Example
In 1996, 12.4% of the population of Quebec province (Canada) was in poverty. The poverty gap
index, applied to the poor only, stood at 0.272. And the Gini coefficient of the poverty gap ratios
was 0.924. Thus the Sen-Shorrocks-Thon index was 0.065 (=0.124 ◊ 0.272 ◊ (1+0.924)).
Osberg and Xu (1999) use the SST index to compare poverty across the 10 Canadian provinces
for 1984, 1989, 1994, 1995 and 1995, as well as to put the degree of Canadian provincial poverty into an
international context. A number of graphs from their study are reproduced below. Figure 1 provides an
international comparison, using the SST index, and shows that the US is an outlier with its relatively high
poverty rate (as measured by the SST). A comparison of the US and Canada over time (figure 2) shows
that while poverty was similar in the two countries a generation ago, it is now higher in the US. Figure 3
provides information on some Canadian provinces: Newfoundland was the poorest in 1984, but by 1996
had become much less of an outlier.
One strength of the SST index is that it can help give a good sense of the sources of change in
poverty over time. This is because the index may be decomposed into
(4.9) )à1ln(lnlnln 10
PP
SST GPPP +∆+∆+∆=∆ ,
which may be interpreted as, % change in SST index = % change in headcount index + % change in
poverty gap index ( among poor) + % change in (1+Gini coefficient of poverty gaps).
In plain English, this allows us to decompose poverty into three aspects: are there more poor? are
the poor poorer? and is there higher inequality among the poor?
 
 
47
 
 
48
Example:
The information in table 4.2 comes from Osberg and Xu, and traces the evolution of poverty in
the Canadian province of Newfoundland between 1984 and 1996. It is clear that most of the
change in the poverty rate over time was due to variations in the number of people in poverty
(P1), rather than in the size of the poverty gap per poor person (P1P
) or the distribution of poverty
among the poor (GP
).
Table 4.2: Decomposition of poverty, and changes in poverty, in Newfoundland
SST
index
P0 PP1 1+GP ∆lnSST
index
∆LnP0 ∆lnPP1 ∆ln(1+GP
)
1984 .137 .245 .304 1.844
1989 .095 .169 .296 1.897 -.370* -.372* -.027 .028
1994 .105 .184 .304 1.884 .104 .086 .026 -.007
1995 .125 .212 .316 1.864 .168 .141 .038 -.010
1996 .092 .164 .294 1.897 -.307 -.254 -.071 .018
Notes: * denotes statistically significant at the 95% level. Poverty line is half of median equivalent income, using the ìOECD
scaleî (i.e. equivalent income = 1 + 0.7(Nadults-1)+0.5(Nchildren).
Source: Osberg and Xu, 1999.
Note that the values of the Sen-Shorrocks-Thon index provided by Osberg and Xu do not give
just a single point estimate for each province; they also provide a confidence interval. Because the SST
index is complex, it is not possible to compute these confidence intervals analytically. Instead, they are
 
 
49
computed artificially using bootstrapping. The basic idea behind the bootstrap is straightforward and
clever. Suppose we have a survey sample of 2,000 households. Now pick a sample of 2,000 from this
sample with replacement ñ i.e. pick a household, then put it back into the sample, pick another household,
put it back into the sample, and so on, until you have picked 2,000 households. Compute the SST index
using this artificial sample. Then repeat the process many times; Osberg and Xu use 300 repetitions. The
result is a distribution of values of the SST, from which it is easy to find (say) the 95% confidence
interval. A sample code to generate confidence intervals for the SST index is given in the exercise for
Chapter Five.
4.6 Time taken to exit
Previous poverty profiles for

fdg43444

تدریس تکنیکهای زبان ت چهارشنبه ۲۸ شهریور ۰۳ | ۲۰:۴۹ ۱۰ بازديد
167Historical
The Evolution of Heliborne Operations
in the Cold War Conflicts of Algeria,
Angola and Rhodesia, 1954-1979
Stephen Rookes
Dr. Stephen Rookes is a research fellow at the Centre de Recherche de
l’Ecole de l’air (CRéA) at Salon-de-Provence. The author of numerous pu-
blished articles and monographs in French and in English, he specializes in the
study of colonial and post-colonial conflicts in Africa.
“Confuse the enemy. Keep him in the dark on your intentions. Sometimes
what seems a victory isn’t really a victory, and sometimes a defeat isn’t really a
defeat. Whether in attacking, counterattacking, or defensive tactics, the idea of
attack should remain central, to always keep the initiative.”
Général Vo Nguyen Giap
If the helicopter’s innate qualities made it a valuable asset to armed
forces, its early use was restricted to enabling duties such as the treatment
and evacuation of casualties (casevac) from the battlefield or the transport
of supplies. Despite these somewhat humble and perfunctory beginnings, as
the face of warfare became more irregular in nature it was soon realised that
the qualities in question (the ability to hover, the ability to take off and land
in confined areas, etc.) might be exploited so that the helicopter became a
frontline actor rather than acting as backline support. This evolution taking
place within a matter of years, by the end of the 1950s rotary-winged aircraft
had progressed to providing air mobility for ground troops. Concurrently,
engineers at Bell Aircraft were investigating helicopter gunships and by the
end of 1967 had produced the first dedicated attack helicopter, the Bell AH-1
Cobra. Though a not so iconoclastic feature of the Vietnam War the Bell
 
 
168
The Evolution of Heliborne Operations…
UH-1 Iroquois or ‘Huey’, its development and use contributed to the Soviet
Union also examining the possibility of transforming the common passen-
ger helicopter into an assault weapon. First producing the Mi-8 in 1967,
Mil then went on to create the Mi-24. Featuring prominently in the Soviet
Union’s fight against Afghanistan’s Mujahedeen in the 1980s, by the 1990s
this ‘Hind’ gunship could be found in Sierra Leone in the fight against the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Piloted by a Rhodesian mercenary em-
ployed by Executive Outcomes, it defeated rebel forces almost single-hande-
dly.1 As of today, helicopter gunships such as the Eurocopter Tiger are being
used by French forces in the fight against Jihadist-led terrorism in the Sahel.
It is somewhat of a paradox that both Rhodesians and French were and
are still involved in latter-day helicopter operations in Africa. In effect, and
along with Portugal, both Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and France played
major role in the evolutionary process described hereinabove. To be more
exact, the operations designed and / or honed during wars in Algeria (1954-
1962), Angola (1961-1974) and Rhodesia (1964-1979) are still highly in-
fluential in the development of strategies implemented to combat the type
of guerrilla tactics still used by insurgents in a wide range of operations
including Barkhane.
While this article presents background information necessary for a contex-
tual understanding of the three conflicts in question,2 much closer attention
will be given to aspects of a more logistical and technical nature. Effectively,
the article divided into three separate sections, each dealing with one parti-
cular conflict, we then move on to a closer examination of what determined
the choice to use helicopters frontline utilities, who made those choices, what
adaptations helicopters underwent, and what purpose those helicopters ser-
ved. Importantly, this article focuses on one type of heliborne operation in
particular. Indeed, the emphasis will be placed on the development and imple-
mentation of envelopment manoeuvres as they provided the platform for the
evolution of future rotary wing operations. Though this expository discussion
forms the bulk, it appears essential that we shed also some light on a range
of external, and principally, political considerations that were influential in
determining the aforementioned choices. To make this more clear, our unders-
tanding of the reasons why certain types of operation, certain types of heli-
copter, or certain types of weaponry were used in operations is incomplete if
facets of a political nature are overlooked. This is particularly true in the cases
of Portugal and Rhodesia: their security forces were hamstrung by political-
ly-determined limitations. However, we will see that the result of these limita-
1. La Guardia, “Airborne Adventurer Keeps Freetown Free”, The Telegraph, 18 June 2000.
2. The study of Portugal’s contemporaneous wars in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau has
not been prioritised due to their being subject to regional considerations different from those
in Angola.
 
 
169Historical
tions led to more inventiveness and an unwitting contribution to helicopter
warfare. An underlying theme is French association with the Angolan and
Rhodesian conflicts. Indeed, closer examination of the role played by France
helps us to gain a better understanding of the Cold War in Africa in the 1960s
and 1970s as well as events still unfolding in the western part of the continent.
The Case of Algeria
The Background
Described as a “Savage War of Peace” by British historian Sir Alis-
tair Horne, 3 the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) began on 1
November 1954 when soldiers loyal to the Front de Libération National
(FNL) carried out a series of attacks against symbols of French rule.
These attacks known collectively as the Toussaint Rouge, 4 the next major
action designed to challenge French authority in this part of northern
Africa was the massacre of pieds-noirs at Philippeville in August 1955. 5
Though the initial reply of French security forces was excessive, 6 the go-
vernor general of French Algeria Jacques Soustelle was acutely aware
of the role psychological factors played in modern warfare and, after
having visited Philippeville, he set about devising a plan emphasising the
integration of France’s Algeria’s Muslim population within the French
system. 7 Having carried out further attacks on urban targets that same
month, 8 but seeing the scope for further activity repressed by the arrival
of France’s 10th Parachute Division, ANL commanders decided in Sou-
mmam that the most effective military strategy was to take the war away
from urban centres such as Oran, Algiers and Constantine and focus its
efforts on the mountains in the Aurès and Djudjura, or Algeria’s high
plateaux and valleys. In this way, the ANL believed it could evade the
French military and bolster its ranks by using local militias known as
Fellaghas to brutalise local populations into either joining the movement
3. Horne, A Savage War of Peace.
4. A literal translation is “Bloody All-Saints’ Day”. Generally considered as the beginning
of the Algerian War, Algerian separatists carried out a series of seventy raids against police
and army outposts, and industrial infrastructures. Ten people lost their lives in the attacks.
5. The attack on Philippeville was the first major offensive carried out by the FNL. Seven-
ty-one pieds-noirs (French citizens born in Algeria) were killed. Another attack occurred at
El-Halia, a mining town also in the Constantine region where thirty-seven Europeans were
killed.
6. Estimates on the number of dead come from FLN sources.
7. Bocca, 1.
8. Attacks included that which took place in the rue de Thèbes in August and against a caf-
eteria in September. The first killing 80 people, the second against a local Milk-Bar resulted
in the deaths of three people.
 
 
170
The Evolution of Heliborne Operations…
or becoming sympathisers. 9 Added to these typically Maoist methods of
waging guerilla warfare, 10 ANL strategists devised an organisational plan
whereby Algeria was divided up into six regional commands, or Wilayas,
that served as operational bases. 11
As for the tactics used by the ALN, they resembled those encountered by
the French in Indochina. Used unsurprisingly given that many ALN com-
batants had served in the Indochinese War and had first-hand experience
of Maoist guerilla tactics,12 the ALN chose to implement a three-phase in-
surgency strategy consisting, firstly, of carrying out small-scale ambushes
and acts of terrorism; secondly, of carrying out more offensive actions
once its own forces were large enough; and, thirdly, using conventional me-
thods to meet the adversary head on. Despite the ALN implementing the
first phase of this strategy, receiving regular supplies of arms,13 and using
Tunisia and Morocco as additional operational bases, as of 1956 France
enjoyed an overwhelming military superiority over the FLN. 14
The French Reaction
Gaining military superiority over such a short space of time can be ex-
plained by the fact that French strategists realised that modern warfare was
an interlocking system of political, economic, psychological and military ac-
tions designed to overthrow one regime and replace it with another. 15 Conse-
quently, as illustrated by the Soustelle Plan, a significant effort was made to
persuade Algeria’s indigenous population that the French rather than the
regime advocated by the FLN was the most preferable of the two and that
France would provide its needs. A second step was convincing Algeria’s po-
pulation that the FLN was the enemy, and demonstrating that any attempt
to impose a regime by force would be met with superior force. Stages in this
process included the recruitment of a home-grown, pro-French military force
known the Harkis,16 and swamping Algeria with hundreds of thousands of
metropolitan troops. Numbering nearly 400,000 by 1957, these played a de-
cisive role in securing the Algerian capital, Algiers and its surrounding areas.
9. Though used by the French in Algeria, the term was considered as pejorative. The FLN
typically used the term ‘junud’ to describe its foot soldiers, ‘mujahideen’ to describe its elite
troops, and ‘musubilan’ to describe auxiliary units. Meynier, 154-160.
10. For more on these methods see, Mao Tse-tung, On Guerilla Warfare (1937).
11. The areas covered by each Wilaya is as follows: Wilaya 1 (Aurès-Nementchas), Wilaya
2 (North Constantine), Wilaya 3 (Kabilyia), Wilaya 4 (L’Algérois), Wilaya 5 (L’Oranie), and
Wilaya 6 (South Aumale).
12. Shrader, 146.
13. In 1954, the Arab League of States made a commitment to assist other Arab states to gain
independence. Cairo became one of the main hubs for the transfer of weapons into Algeria.
14. Galula, 68.
15. Trinquier, 5.
16. Estimates put the number of Harkis at some 300,000. “After 40 years of suffering and
silence, Algeria’s ‘Harkis’ demand a hearing”, Irish Times, 31 August 2001.
 
 
171Historical
This battle of the Casbahs forcing the FLN further into Algeria’s more rural
zones,17 French authorities also initiated a series of measures to ensure that
the FLN found it difficult to recruit rural inhabitants. Indeed, Soustelle set
up Special Administrative Sections (SAS) in 1955 as part of a hearts and
minds programme, and increased the number of security forces serving in re-
mote areas.18 Further organisational measures came through the quadrillage
system. A system whereby urban as well as rural areas were divided up into
geographical zones in which counter-terrorist operations could be organised
on a local level enabling a faster reaction time when enemy activity had been
detected. Efforts were also made to secure Algeria’s borders from infiltration
from Tunisia and Morocco. This was achieved on the eastern border through
the construction of electrified fences known as the Morice and Challe lines
completed in 1957 and 1959 respectively. Carrying as many as 5,000 volts
and 2.5 metres high, each line was equipped with state-of-the-art electronic
detection systems, radars and searchlights making crossing into Algeria al-
most an impossibility. Moreover, the placing of anti-personnel landmines
along the perimetres of the lines ensured that the FLN’s operational areas
were limited to Algerian soil. Thanks to the addition of the French Navy
patrolling the Mediterranean, the French therefore managed to stem the flow
of weapons on to the battlefield.
The Development of Heliborne Operations in Algeria
The implementation of the quadrillage system and the implantation
of the Morice and Challe lines represented the beginning of a heyday for
French aviation and, in particular, rotary wing operations in Algeria.19 The
process towards transforming the helicopter from auxiliary to central actor
began in the Korean War and the Malayan Emergency with the French rea-
lising the potential for helicopters to provide air mobility for ground troops.
Effectively, they had witnessed how US Marines had been transported into
battle aboard Sikorsky S-55 “Chickasaw” during the Korean War,20 and had
gained first-hand experience of heliborne insertion operations through the
assignment of one of its higher-ranking officers, Déodat du Puy-Montbrun,
to the British Special Air Service in Malaya in November 1952.21 These expe-
riences prompted the French Army into commissioning a study in December
17. For more on the Battle of Algiers see, Aussaresses, 2002.
18. Those tasked with the day-to-day running of Special Administrative Sections were
known as ‘kepis bleus’ . They were supported by local Moghazni auxiliaries.
19. At first the French Army used a ratissage system whereby tanks, artillery and sometimes
aviation was used to unearth enemy combatants from their hideouts in the Aurès Mountains
or in Kabylia. Inflicting some losses, once operations were over, these enemy combatants
would simply return and start all over again. A side effect of this strategy was that Algerians
who supported the French were targeted for assassination thus encouraging other Algerians
to join the FLN rather than suffer the same fate. The quadrillage system was an attempt to
secure defined sectors of Algeria so as to eliminate insurgent activity and to reduce the re-
cruitment of local populations into the ranks of the FLN. Alexander and Keiger, 15.
20. “Coalition Air Warfare in the Korean War, 1950-1953”.
21. See Brault.
 
 
172
The Evolution of Heliborne Operations…
1953 whose goal was to examine the effectiveness of heliborne operations in
irregular warfare.22 Along with similar investigative studies carried out by
strategists of the French Aviation Légère d’Observation d’Artillerie (ALOA)
late that year, the results of the studies indicated that vertical takeoff and
landing (VTOL) aircraft could indeed play an important role in the diffe-
rent phases of modern warfare. More specifically, the particularities of the
helicopter meant that it could be used for the vertical envelopment of enemy
forces, 23 infiltration missions, to transport troops quickly into hot zones or to
establish a bridgehead in enemy territory. 24
In terms of how these lessons and innovations were implemented in the
Algerian War, the French began to codify, organise and optimise their rotary
wing operations.25 The first step, therefore, was to revise the structure of the
centralised 5th Air Region and to break it down into smaller units, while the
second consisted of overhauling an ageing aviation stock. 26 These smaller de-
centralised air regions being called Groupes Aériens Tactiques (GATACs), 27
to speed up reaction time and to increase flexibility, a sub-division of these
five larger units were advanced air commands. These units were initially
made up of Escadrilles d’Aviation Légère d’Appui (EALA) using Harvard
T-6s, MS.500s or Trojan T-28Ds, but with the creation of Détachements d’In-
tervention d’Hélicoptères (DIH) and Groupements Mobiles d’Hélicoptères,
this fixed-wing stock was complemented with the purchase of around 300
helicopters. Which type of helicopt

feed غذا

تدریس تکنیکهای زبان ت چهارشنبه ۲۸ شهریور ۰۳ | ۱۹:۴۰ ۸ بازديد

deterge زدودن

تدریس تکنیکهای زبان ت چهارشنبه ۲۸ شهریور ۰۳ | ۱۹:۲۰ ۶ بازديد

farmer market بازرا روز

تدریس تکنیکهای زبان ت چهارشنبه ۲۸ شهریور ۰۳ | ۱۸:۴۴ ۱۰ بازديد

444444444gg44444

تدریس تکنیکهای زبان ت چهارشنبه ۲۸ شهریور ۰۳ | ۱۷:۱۶ ۹ بازديد
fdgfdgfdgfdgfdgdfgdfgdfgdfgdfggfdgdfgdfgdfgdfdfgdfgdfgdfgdfgdfgdfgdfgdfgdfg

gg44444

تدریس تکنیکهای زبان ت چهارشنبه ۲۸ شهریور ۰۳ | ۱۵:۳۱ ۷ بازديد
cedes morning; what
corresponds to night is with those in hell. 120
From this
correspondence “day” and “year” signify in the Word states of
life in general; “heat” and “light” signify love and wisdom;
“morning” the first and highest degree of love; “noon” wisdom
in its light; “evening” wisdom in its shade; “dawn” the
obscurity that precedes the morning; anerfect state than those
round about even to the circumference (see above, HEAVEN AND HELL 124
18
Time in Heaven
162. Although there is a succession and a progression of all
things in heaven, as in the world, yet angels have no notion or
idea of time and space; and this so completely that they do not
even know at all what time and space are. Time in heaven will
here be considered, and space in its own chapter.
163. Angels do not know what time is, althoning, noon, evening,
and night; and the four ages of man, infancy, youth, manhood,
and old age; and all other things tha, thus not what God
did from eternity before creation. When anxiety on this
account arose in my mind I was raised up into the sphere of
heaven, and thus into the perception that angels have in respect
to eternity; and it was then made clear to m weeks, and days into
twenty-four hours; and how these times recur by fixed
alternations, and how this is the source of times. On hearing
this he was surprised, saying that he knew nothing about such
things, but only what states are.
[3] In speaking with him I added that it is known in the
world, for men speak as if they knew that there is no time in
heaven, saying of those who die that they “leave the things of
time,” and that they “pass out of time,” meaning by this out of
the world. I said also that some know that times in their origin
are states, for they know that times are in exact accord with the
states of their affections, short to those who are in pleasant and
joyous states, long to those who are in unpleasant and
sorrowful states, and various in a state of hope and expectation;
and this therefore leads learned men to inquire what time and
space are, and some know that time belongs to the natural
man.
169. The natural man might think that he would be
deprived of all thought if the ideas of time, space, and material
things were taken away; for upon these all the thought of man
rests. 126
But let him know that so far as thoughts partake of
time, space, and mattere that eternity must
be thought of, not from time but from state; and then the
meaning of “from eternity” can be seen. This then happened to
me.
168. When angels speak with men they never express
themselves in natural ideas proper to man, all of which are
from time, space, matter, and things analogous thereto, but in
spiritual ideas, all of which are from states and their various
changes within the angels and outside of them. Nevertheless,
when these angelic ideas, which are spiritual, flow into men,
they are turned in a moment and of themselves into natural
ideas proper to man, that correspond perfectly to the spiritual
ideas. Neither angels nor men know that this takes place; but
such is all influx of heaven into man. Certain angels were
permitted to enter more nearly intot either exist from time or
have a succession in accordance with time. In thinking of these
a man thinks from time, but an angel from state; and in
consequence what there is in them from time with man is with
the angels turned into an idea of state. Spring and morning are
turned into an idea of the state of love and wisdom such as
they are in angels in their first state; summer and noon are
turned into an idea of love and wisdom such as they are in the
second state; autumn and evening such as they are in the third
state; night and winter into an ideaugh with them
there is a successive progression of all things, as there is in the
world, and this so completely that there is no difference
whatever; and the reason is that in heaven instead of years and
days there are changes of state; and where there are years and
days there are times, but where there are changes of state there
are states.
164. In the world there are times because the sun of the
world seemingly advances in succession from one degree to
another, producing times that are called seasons of the year;
and besides, it revolves about the earth, producing times that
are called times of day; both of these by fixed alternations.
With the sun of heaven it is different. This does not mark years
and days by successive progressions and revolutions, but in its
appearance it marks changes of state; and this, as has been
shown in the preceding chapter, is not done by fixed
alternations. Consequently no idea of time is possible to angels;
but in its place they have an idea of state (see above n. 154).
165. As angels have no idea derived n. 43, 128).
But it would be tedious to specify the differences, since the
changes each one undergoes are in accdor that cannot be
described; and I was told that such is the appearance of the
Lord as a sun to the angels in their first stHEAVEN AND HELL 123
once, but in one society after another. Furthermore, I was told
that these alternations are not fixed, but come upon them
sooner or later without their knowledge. And it was added that
the sun in itself is not thus changed or moved; but it takes on
this appearance in accord with their successive progressions of
state, since the Lord appears to everyone in accord with what
his state is, thus glowing when one is in intense love and less
glowing and finally shining white as his love subsides; and the
quality of each one’s state was represented by the obscure belt
that induced upon the sun these apparent variations in its glow
and light.
160. When angels are in the last of these states, which is
when they are in what is their own, they begin to be sad. I have
talked with them when they were in that state and have seen
their sadness; but they said tate. Afterwards there
appeared a great obscure belt about the sun, and by this its first
glow and brilliancy, which gave it such splendor, began to be
dulled, and I was told that such is the appearance of the sun to
them in their second state. Then the belt seemed by degrees to
grow darker, and the sun to appear less glowing, and this by
degrees until at length it took on a shining whiteness; and I was
told that such is the appearance of the sun to them in their
third state. After this, that shining whiteness was seen to move
to the left toward the moon of heaven, and to add itself to her
light; and in consequence the moon shone forth with
unwonted splendor; and I was told that such is the fourth state
of those in the celestial kingdom and the first state of those in
the spiritual kingdom, and that in both kingdoms changes of
state have such alternatioord with the quality of
his love and faith. From this it happens that while one may be
in clearness and delight another may be in obscurity and lack
of delight, and this at the same time within the same society.
So, too, the state differs in different societies; it is different in
the societies of the celestial kingdom from what it is in those of
the spiritual kingdom. These differences in the changes of state
are in general like the variations of the states of days in
different climates on the earth, for with some it is morning
when with others it is evening, and with some it is hot when
with others it is cold.
158. I have been taught from heaven why there are such
changes of state there. The angels said that there are many
reasons—first, the delight of life d “night” the absence
of love and wisdom. 121
156. Together with the state of the angels’ interiors which
pertain to their love and wisdom, the states of various things
that are outside of them and that they see with their eyes are
changed; for the things outside of them take on an appearance
that is in accord with the things within them. But what things
these are, and what kind of things they are, shall be told
presently in the chapter on
sdf

تازه ترين مطالب

خلاصه آمار

  • مجموع نمایش‌ ۵,۰۱۲
  • مجموع بازدید ۴,۱۴۲
  • بازدید امروز ۵۲۲
  • بازدید دیروز ۳۶
  • مجموع مطالب ۵۰۵
  • مجموع نظرات ۵
  • افراد آنلاین ۱

من در شبكه هاي اجتماعي

آرشيو

ديكشنري

مترجم

وی بلاگ : رسـانه وبلاگ نويسان حرفـه اي