چهارشنبه ۲۸ شهریور ۰۳ | ۲۰:۴۹ ۱۱ بازديد
167Historical
The Evolution of Heliborne Operations
in the Cold War Conflicts of Algeria,
Angola and Rhodesia, 1954-1979
Stephen Rookes
Dr. Stephen Rookes is a research fellow at the Centre de Recherche de
l’Ecole de l’air (CRéA) at Salon-de-Provence. The author of numerous pu-
blished articles and monographs in French and in English, he specializes in the
study of colonial and post-colonial conflicts in Africa.
“Confuse the enemy. Keep him in the dark on your intentions. Sometimes
what seems a victory isn’t really a victory, and sometimes a defeat isn’t really a
defeat. Whether in attacking, counterattacking, or defensive tactics, the idea of
attack should remain central, to always keep the initiative.”
Général Vo Nguyen Giap
If the helicopter’s innate qualities made it a valuable asset to armed
forces, its early use was restricted to enabling duties such as the treatment
and evacuation of casualties (casevac) from the battlefield or the transport
of supplies. Despite these somewhat humble and perfunctory beginnings, as
the face of warfare became more irregular in nature it was soon realised that
the qualities in question (the ability to hover, the ability to take off and land
in confined areas, etc.) might be exploited so that the helicopter became a
frontline actor rather than acting as backline support. This evolution taking
place within a matter of years, by the end of the 1950s rotary-winged aircraft
had progressed to providing air mobility for ground troops. Concurrently,
engineers at Bell Aircraft were investigating helicopter gunships and by the
end of 1967 had produced the first dedicated attack helicopter, the Bell AH-1
Cobra. Though a not so iconoclastic feature of the Vietnam War the Bell
The Evolution of Heliborne Operations
in the Cold War Conflicts of Algeria,
Angola and Rhodesia, 1954-1979
Stephen Rookes
Dr. Stephen Rookes is a research fellow at the Centre de Recherche de
l’Ecole de l’air (CRéA) at Salon-de-Provence. The author of numerous pu-
blished articles and monographs in French and in English, he specializes in the
study of colonial and post-colonial conflicts in Africa.
“Confuse the enemy. Keep him in the dark on your intentions. Sometimes
what seems a victory isn’t really a victory, and sometimes a defeat isn’t really a
defeat. Whether in attacking, counterattacking, or defensive tactics, the idea of
attack should remain central, to always keep the initiative.”
Général Vo Nguyen Giap
If the helicopter’s innate qualities made it a valuable asset to armed
forces, its early use was restricted to enabling duties such as the treatment
and evacuation of casualties (casevac) from the battlefield or the transport
of supplies. Despite these somewhat humble and perfunctory beginnings, as
the face of warfare became more irregular in nature it was soon realised that
the qualities in question (the ability to hover, the ability to take off and land
in confined areas, etc.) might be exploited so that the helicopter became a
frontline actor rather than acting as backline support. This evolution taking
place within a matter of years, by the end of the 1950s rotary-winged aircraft
had progressed to providing air mobility for ground troops. Concurrently,
engineers at Bell Aircraft were investigating helicopter gunships and by the
end of 1967 had produced the first dedicated attack helicopter, the Bell AH-1
Cobra. Though a not so iconoclastic feature of the Vietnam War the Bell
The Evolution of Heliborne Operations…
UH-1 Iroquois or ‘Huey’, its development and use contributed to the Soviet
Union also examining the possibility of transforming the common passen-
ger helicopter into an assault weapon. First producing the Mi-8 in 1967,
Mil then went on to create the Mi-24. Featuring prominently in the Soviet
Union’s fight against Afghanistan’s Mujahedeen in the 1980s, by the 1990s
this ‘Hind’ gunship could be found in Sierra Leone in the fight against the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Piloted by a Rhodesian mercenary em-
ployed by Executive Outcomes, it defeated rebel forces almost single-hande-
dly.1 As of today, helicopter gunships such as the Eurocopter Tiger are being
used by French forces in the fight against Jihadist-led terrorism in the Sahel.
It is somewhat of a paradox that both Rhodesians and French were and
are still involved in latter-day helicopter operations in Africa. In effect, and
along with Portugal, both Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and France played
major role in the evolutionary process described hereinabove. To be more
exact, the operations designed and / or honed during wars in Algeria (1954-
1962), Angola (1961-1974) and Rhodesia (1964-1979) are still highly in-
fluential in the development of strategies implemented to combat the type
of guerrilla tactics still used by insurgents in a wide range of operations
including Barkhane.
While this article presents background information necessary for a contex-
tual understanding of the three conflicts in question,2 much closer attention
will be given to aspects of a more logistical and technical nature. Effectively,
the article divided into three separate sections, each dealing with one parti-
cular conflict, we then move on to a closer examination of what determined
the choice to use helicopters frontline utilities, who made those choices, what
adaptations helicopters underwent, and what purpose those helicopters ser-
ved. Importantly, this article focuses on one type of heliborne operation in
particular. Indeed, the emphasis will be placed on the development and imple-
mentation of envelopment manoeuvres as they provided the platform for the
evolution of future rotary wing operations. Though this expository discussion
forms the bulk, it appears essential that we shed also some light on a range
of external, and principally, political considerations that were influential in
determining the aforementioned choices. To make this more clear, our unders-
tanding of the reasons why certain types of operation, certain types of heli-
copter, or certain types of weaponry were used in operations is incomplete if
facets of a political nature are overlooked. This is particularly true in the cases
of Portugal and Rhodesia: their security forces were hamstrung by political-
ly-determined limitations. However, we will see that the result of these limita-
1. La Guardia, “Airborne Adventurer Keeps Freetown Free”, The Telegraph, 18 June 2000.
2. The study of Portugal’s contemporaneous wars in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau has
not been prioritised due to their being subject to regional considerations different from those
in Angola.
tions led to more inventiveness and an unwitting contribution to helicopter
warfare. An underlying theme is French association with the Angolan and
Rhodesian conflicts. Indeed, closer examination of the role played by France
helps us to gain a better understanding of the Cold War in Africa in the 1960s
and 1970s as well as events still unfolding in the western part of the continent.
The Case of Algeria
The Background
Described as a “Savage War of Peace” by British historian Sir Alis-
tair Horne, 3 the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) began on 1
November 1954 when soldiers loyal to the Front de Libération National
(FNL) carried out a series of attacks against symbols of French rule.
These attacks known collectively as the Toussaint Rouge, 4 the next major
action designed to challenge French authority in this part of northern
Africa was the massacre of pieds-noirs at Philippeville in August 1955. 5
Though the initial reply of French security forces was excessive, 6 the go-
vernor general of French Algeria Jacques Soustelle was acutely aware
of the role psychological factors played in modern warfare and, after
having visited Philippeville, he set about devising a plan emphasising the
integration of France’s Algeria’s Muslim population within the French
system. 7 Having carried out further attacks on urban targets that same
month, 8 but seeing the scope for further activity repressed by the arrival
of France’s 10th Parachute Division, ANL commanders decided in Sou-
mmam that the most effective military strategy was to take the war away
from urban centres such as Oran, Algiers and Constantine and focus its
efforts on the mountains in the Aurès and Djudjura, or Algeria’s high
plateaux and valleys. In this way, the ANL believed it could evade the
French military and bolster its ranks by using local militias known as
Fellaghas to brutalise local populations into either joining the movement
3. Horne, A Savage War of Peace.
4. A literal translation is “Bloody All-Saints’ Day”. Generally considered as the beginning
of the Algerian War, Algerian separatists carried out a series of seventy raids against police
and army outposts, and industrial infrastructures. Ten people lost their lives in the attacks.
5. The attack on Philippeville was the first major offensive carried out by the FNL. Seven-
ty-one pieds-noirs (French citizens born in Algeria) were killed. Another attack occurred at
El-Halia, a mining town also in the Constantine region where thirty-seven Europeans were
killed.
6. Estimates on the number of dead come from FLN sources.
7. Bocca, 1.
8. Attacks included that which took place in the rue de Thèbes in August and against a caf-
eteria in September. The first killing 80 people, the second against a local Milk-Bar resulted
in the deaths of three people.
The Evolution of Heliborne Operations…
or becoming sympathisers. 9 Added to these typically Maoist methods of
waging guerilla warfare, 10 ANL strategists devised an organisational plan
whereby Algeria was divided up into six regional commands, or Wilayas,
that served as operational bases. 11
As for the tactics used by the ALN, they resembled those encountered by
the French in Indochina. Used unsurprisingly given that many ALN com-
batants had served in the Indochinese War and had first-hand experience
of Maoist guerilla tactics,12 the ALN chose to implement a three-phase in-
surgency strategy consisting, firstly, of carrying out small-scale ambushes
and acts of terrorism; secondly, of carrying out more offensive actions
once its own forces were large enough; and, thirdly, using conventional me-
thods to meet the adversary head on. Despite the ALN implementing the
first phase of this strategy, receiving regular supplies of arms,13 and using
Tunisia and Morocco as additional operational bases, as of 1956 France
enjoyed an overwhelming military superiority over the FLN. 14
The French Reaction
Gaining military superiority over such a short space of time can be ex-
plained by the fact that French strategists realised that modern warfare was
an interlocking system of political, economic, psychological and military ac-
tions designed to overthrow one regime and replace it with another. 15 Conse-
quently, as illustrated by the Soustelle Plan, a significant effort was made to
persuade Algeria’s indigenous population that the French rather than the
regime advocated by the FLN was the most preferable of the two and that
France would provide its needs. A second step was convincing Algeria’s po-
pulation that the FLN was the enemy, and demonstrating that any attempt
to impose a regime by force would be met with superior force. Stages in this
process included the recruitment of a home-grown, pro-French military force
known the Harkis,16 and swamping Algeria with hundreds of thousands of
metropolitan troops. Numbering nearly 400,000 by 1957, these played a de-
cisive role in securing the Algerian capital, Algiers and its surrounding areas.
9. Though used by the French in Algeria, the term was considered as pejorative. The FLN
typically used the term ‘junud’ to describe its foot soldiers, ‘mujahideen’ to describe its elite
troops, and ‘musubilan’ to describe auxiliary units. Meynier, 154-160.
10. For more on these methods see, Mao Tse-tung, On Guerilla Warfare (1937).
11. The areas covered by each Wilaya is as follows: Wilaya 1 (Aurès-Nementchas), Wilaya
2 (North Constantine), Wilaya 3 (Kabilyia), Wilaya 4 (L’Algérois), Wilaya 5 (L’Oranie), and
Wilaya 6 (South Aumale).
12. Shrader, 146.
13. In 1954, the Arab League of States made a commitment to assist other Arab states to gain
independence. Cairo became one of the main hubs for the transfer of weapons into Algeria.
14. Galula, 68.
15. Trinquier, 5.
16. Estimates put the number of Harkis at some 300,000. “After 40 years of suffering and
silence, Algeria’s ‘Harkis’ demand a hearing”, Irish Times, 31 August 2001.
This battle of the Casbahs forcing the FLN further into Algeria’s more rural
zones,17 French authorities also initiated a series of measures to ensure that
the FLN found it difficult to recruit rural inhabitants. Indeed, Soustelle set
up Special Administrative Sections (SAS) in 1955 as part of a hearts and
minds programme, and increased the number of security forces serving in re-
mote areas.18 Further organisational measures came through the quadrillage
system. A system whereby urban as well as rural areas were divided up into
geographical zones in which counter-terrorist operations could be organised
on a local level enabling a faster reaction time when enemy activity had been
detected. Efforts were also made to secure Algeria’s borders from infiltration
from Tunisia and Morocco. This was achieved on the eastern border through
the construction of electrified fences known as the Morice and Challe lines
completed in 1957 and 1959 respectively. Carrying as many as 5,000 volts
and 2.5 metres high, each line was equipped with state-of-the-art electronic
detection systems, radars and searchlights making crossing into Algeria al-
most an impossibility. Moreover, the placing of anti-personnel landmines
along the perimetres of the lines ensured that the FLN’s operational areas
were limited to Algerian soil. Thanks to the addition of the French Navy
patrolling the Mediterranean, the French therefore managed to stem the flow
of weapons on to the battlefield.
The Development of Heliborne Operations in Algeria
The implementation of the quadrillage system and the implantation
of the Morice and Challe lines represented the beginning of a heyday for
French aviation and, in particular, rotary wing operations in Algeria.19 The
process towards transforming the helicopter from auxiliary to central actor
began in the Korean War and the Malayan Emergency with the French rea-
lising the potential for helicopters to provide air mobility for ground troops.
Effectively, they had witnessed how US Marines had been transported into
battle aboard Sikorsky S-55 “Chickasaw” during the Korean War,20 and had
gained first-hand experience of heliborne insertion operations through the
assignment of one of its higher-ranking officers, Déodat du Puy-Montbrun,
to the British Special Air Service in Malaya in November 1952.21 These expe-
riences prompted the French Army into commissioning a study in December
17. For more on the Battle of Algiers see, Aussaresses, 2002.
18. Those tasked with the day-to-day running of Special Administrative Sections were
known as ‘kepis bleus’ . They were supported by local Moghazni auxiliaries.
19. At first the French Army used a ratissage system whereby tanks, artillery and sometimes
aviation was used to unearth enemy combatants from their hideouts in the Aurès Mountains
or in Kabylia. Inflicting some losses, once operations were over, these enemy combatants
would simply return and start all over again. A side effect of this strategy was that Algerians
who supported the French were targeted for assassination thus encouraging other Algerians
to join the FLN rather than suffer the same fate. The quadrillage system was an attempt to
secure defined sectors of Algeria so as to eliminate insurgent activity and to reduce the re-
cruitment of local populations into the ranks of the FLN. Alexander and Keiger, 15.
20. “Coalition Air Warfare in the Korean War, 1950-1953”.
21. See Brault.
The Evolution of Heliborne Operations…
1953 whose goal was to examine the effectiveness of heliborne operations in
irregular warfare.22 Along with similar investigative studies carried out by
strategists of the French Aviation Légère d’Observation d’Artillerie (ALOA)
late that year, the results of the studies indicated that vertical takeoff and
landing (VTOL) aircraft could indeed play an important role in the diffe-
rent phases of modern warfare. More specifically, the particularities of the
helicopter meant that it could be used for the vertical envelopment of enemy
forces, 23 infiltration missions, to transport troops quickly into hot zones or to
establish a bridgehead in enemy territory. 24
In terms of how these lessons and innovations were implemented in the
Algerian War, the French began to codify, organise and optimise their rotary
wing operations.25 The first step, therefore, was to revise the structure of the
centralised 5th Air Region and to break it down into smaller units, while the
second consisted of overhauling an ageing aviation stock. 26 These smaller de-
centralised air regions being called Groupes Aériens Tactiques (GATACs), 27
to speed up reaction time and to increase flexibility, a sub-division of these
five larger units were advanced air commands. These units were initially
made up of Escadrilles d’Aviation Légère d’Appui (EALA) using Harvard
T-6s, MS.500s or Trojan T-28Ds, but with the creation of Détachements d’In-
tervention d’Hélicoptères (DIH) and Groupements Mobiles d’Hélicoptères,
this fixed-wing stock was complemented with the purchase of around 300
helicopters. Which type of helicopt
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