چهارشنبه ۲۸ شهریور ۰۳ | ۱۲:۱۰ ۱۱ بازديد
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
FOREIGN POLICY
Key Takeaways
● The PRC’s foreign policy seeks to build a “community of common destiny” that supports its
strategy to realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” The PRC’s ambition to
reshape the international order derives from the objectives of its national strategy and the
Party’s political and governing systems.
● In 2022, the PRC employed multiple diplomatic tools in an attempt to erode U.S. and partner
influence and sought to cultivate international support against intensifying U.S.-backed
security partnerships such as the Quad and AUKUS.
● Russia’s war on Ukraine in February 2022 represented a major, unexpected challenge for the
PRC as it sought to react to the largest military conflict in Europe since the end of World War
II. Beijing has increasingly sought to balance its strategic partnership with Russia while
avoiding the reputational or economic costs that would result from providing non-deniable
material offensive or “lethal” assistance to Russia.
● Beijing probably has taken a discreet, flexible, and cautious approach to providing material
support to Russia to enable the PRC to maintain plausible deniability, control material
transfers, create off-ramps to renege on agreements, and maximize the PRC’s options to aid
Russia.
The PRC has increasingly sought to use its growing diplomatic clout to promote a more prominent,
global leadership role for Beijing in international affairs. China continued to advance a new
diplomatic framework that it terms “Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics,” based
on the foreign policy direction determined by the CCP Central Committee and reaffirmed at the
20th Party Congress. This framework seeks to advance the PRC’s strategy of national rejuvenation
by achieving the CCP’s two centenary goals, improving the coordination of China’s major
domestic and international policies, reforming aspects of the international order, adhering to the
CCP Central Committee’s direction, and defending the PRC’s major interests. At the same time,
PRC leaders are increasingly aware that the PRC foreign security environment is becoming more
unstable and dangerous, especially in the wake of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, which
could disrupt the PRC’s foreign policy objectives.
The CCP’s theory of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” underpins the conduct of the PRC’s
foreign affairs. Since Xi assumed power at the 18th Party Congress in 2012, the CCP Central
Committee has placed greater emphasis on the PRC’s foreign policy advancing “the cause of
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” Yang Jiechi, a former top Party official for the PRC’s
foreign policy, has claimed that adherence to Socialism with Chinese Characteristics is “showing
extremely bright prospects” and “reached a new historical starting point.”
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
According to Party officials, the overall goal of the PRC’s foreign policy is to build a “community
of common destiny” that seeks to shift the international system towards an architecture based on
the CCP’s principles for how nations should interact. This goal is essential to how the PRC’s
foreign policy supports its broader strategy to achieve national rejuvenation. From the PRC’s
perspective, establishing this “community” is necessary to set the external security and economic
conditions for the PRC’s national rejuvenation by “safeguarding world peace” and “promoting
common development” according to the Party’s principles. The PRC recognizes it cannot achieve
its goals in isolation and seeks “all countries” to adopt its diplomatic framework in order to “build
a community with a shared future for mankind” and “actively control the new direction of China
and the world.” Lastly, PRC officials acknowledge that aspects of the international order are
inconsistent with its objectives. The PRC’s diplomatic framework seeks to remedy this by
promoting changes in a more “just and reasonable direction.”
The PRC’s ambition to shape the international order derives from the objectives of its national
strategy and the Party’s political and governing systems. The PRC does not frame its efforts as
simply opportunistic challenges to the status quo or a significant deviation from the past. Rather,
Beijing is acting upon its longstanding desire to redesign the architecture of the international order
to support the PRC’s national rejuvenation, efforts that are married with growing resources and
opportunities to do so. The PRC’s foreign policy seeks to revise aspects of the international order
on the Party’s terms and in accordance with ideas and principles it views as essential to forging an
external environment supportive of the PRC’s national rejuvenation and strategic goals.
The PRC’s foreign policy framework includes efforts to promote and accelerate the transformation
in the distribution of power, revise the principles of interstate relations, and reform global
governance structures. Within the context of “Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese
Characteristics,” PRC officials have described how the PRC differentiates its goals and relations
according to the power relationships among four categories of actors: major powers, peripheral
nations, developing nations, and international organizations. Among the major powers, Beijing
contends that a new framework for relations is necessary to construct a “stable and balanced
development” between the powers—in essence a multipolar system. With peripheral nations, the
PRC seeks to strengthen its relationships to create a more favorable environment along its maritime
and land borders in accordance with the PRC’s view of justice and interests. For developing
countries, the PRC emphasizes solidarity and cooperation as well as “actively” carrying out
multilateral diplomatic work, to include continued “high-quality development” under its Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI). This likely refers to the importance that the PRC places on attaining support
from developing countries within international organizations.
Another tenet of “Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics” is the PRC’s ambition
to construct “new types” of “omnidirectional” relations and bilateral partnerships among states.
The PRC desires for its concepts of mutual respect, cooperation, and mutual benefit to provide the
basis for these “new types” of relations. Politburo member Yang Jiechi describes China’s “new
type” relationships as strategic partnerships that follow a new path of “major power relations.”
Although distinct from alliance relationships, the PRC’s notion of strategic partnerships is
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
indicative of a relationship that meets the PRC’s criteria and is worthy of a higher level of bilateral
cooperation. To improve its diplomatic support further, the PRC also seeks to create what it calls
a “comprehensive global partnership network” of its strategic partners to form a global “circle of
friends.” Despite its encompassing rhetoric, the PRC uses nomenclature to implicitly rank its level
of “partnership.” For example, the PRC ranks Pakistan as its only “all-weather strategic partner,”
Russia as its only “comprehensive strategic partner with coordination relations,” and other
countries such as Brazil and various states in South and Southeast Asia holding “all-round strategic
partnership relations.”
The PRC also promotes reforms to the “global governance system” as part of its diplomatic
framework in order to reflect the “profound evolution” of the international order. According to
Yang Jiechi, “The global governance system is at an important stage of profound evolution, and
global governance has increasingly become the frontier and key issue of China’s foreign work.”
To “seize opportunities” for reform, the PRC actively participates in the construction of a new
global governance system based upon the Party’s principles. This may be achieved through the
creation of new multinational organizations and forums to uphold the authority of the CCP and the
PRC’s national sovereignty, security, and development interests. For example, the PRC promotes
BRI as an “important practical platform for the concept of the community of common destiny.”
BRI also serves to strengthen the PRC’s strategic partnerships, enlarge its network of strategic
partners, and advance reforms to the international order to support the PRC’s strategy.
At the same time, PRC leaders probably increasingly seek to protect the PRC’s interests amid an
external security environment that is becoming more unstable and dangerous. At the 20th Party
Congress in October 2022, Xi proclaimed that “the CCP Central Committee coordinated the
overall strategic situation of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and major changes in the
world unseen in a century.” He added that the “CCP led the entire party, the entire military, and
the people of all ethnic groups across the country to effectively deal with the severe and complex
international situation and the huge risks and challenges that came one after another.” Although
Xi did not mention specific challenges, Russia’s ongoing war of aggression in Ukraine, the PRC’s
heightened threat perception of United States, and lingering economic and political consequences
of the COVID-19 pandemic almost certainly inform the PRC’s current foreign policy aimed at
maximizing the PRC’s ability to shape the international system and better protect PRC’s interests.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
MILITARY AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
20 TH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE CCP
General Secretary Xi presided over the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist
Party, known as the 20th Party Congress, from October 16th –22nd , 2022. Party
Congresses, convened every five years, hold important military and security implications
for the PRC’s national and defense strategy. The military dimensions of the Report to 20th
Party Congress focused on intensifying and accelerating the People’s Liberation Army’s
modernization goals, to include deploying PLA forces on a “regular basis and in diversified
ways.”
In order to achieve the PLA’s 2027 centenary goal, the 20th Party Congress set objectives
to “provide new military strategic guidance, establish a strong system of strategic
deterrence, increase the proportion of new-domain forces (most likely cyberspace and
space) with new combat capabilities, speed up the development of unmanned,
intelligence combat capabilities, and promote the development and application of the
network information system.” Reappointed as Chairman of the CMC for the third time, Xi
selected a six-man CMC that offers political continuity, technical expertise on nuclear and
space issues, and Taiwan-centric operational experience to lead the PLA toward achieving
its centenary goals.
The 20th Party Congress offered new insight on the CCP’s perception of the PRC’s external
security environment. Notably, the Party Congress report did not reference a “strategic
window of opportunity for development,” but rather that the PRC is facing “drastic changes
in the international landscape,” and thus must be more mindful of “potential dangers and
be prepared to deal with worse-case scenarios.”
The PRC employed a wide range of diplomatic tools throughout 2022 to erode U.S. influence
globally and subvert U.S.-backed security partnerships such as the Quad and AUKUS, which
Beijing perceives as avenues to constrain its rise. The CCP is increasingly frustrated by
Washington’s perceived use of an exaggerated threat picture of China to cultivate an international
coalition willing subvert the PRC’s foreign policy objectives. In response, PRC leaders and
officials have increasingly sought to bolster the PRC’s relations with developing countries in
Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East; co-opt regional multilateral organizations such as
ASEAN; and assert its status as the self-appointed de facto leader of the “Global South.” Similarly,
beginning late 2022, Beijing launched a diplomatic “charm offensive” targeting European
countries in an apparent effort to improve perceptions of Beijing following years of “wolf warrior”
diplomacy and COVID-19 isolation. Through these engagements, Beijing aims to internationally
isolate Washington and persuade countries that the United States is the sole party responsible for
escalating U.S.-China tensions, primarily to deflect criticism of the PRC’s efforts to reshape the
international environment to protect its interests. PRC officials have also framed AUKUS as an
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
act of nuclear proliferation and threat to regional stability to stoke international concerns about the
trilateral security partnership and press countries to limit engagement with U.S.-backed alliance.
In recent years, global public opinion of the PRC has fallen, particularly after the PRC’s response
to COVID and continued coercive foreign and domestic policies. Out of 24 countries across
Europe, Asia, and the Americas surveyed by the Pew Research Center in spring 2023, 15 countries
registered their most negative feelings towards the PRC in 2022 or 2023. Similarly, five of the
eight middle-income countries polled saw the PRC in more negative light after the pandemic. In
the 2022 Pew survey, only 18 percent of global respondents trusted Xi Jinping do the right thing
regarding world affairs. These reports are only the most recent in a series of surveys showing an
increasingly negative perception of the PRC across the U.S., Europe, and Asia.
Russia’s War on Ukraine. The Russian war on Ukraine represented a major, unexpected
challenge for Beijing as it sought to react to the largest military conflict in Europe since the end of
World War II. Despite multiple warnings of Russia’s intentions towards Kyiv, Beijing was caught
completely off guard by the full scope and scale of Russia’s war on Ukraine. For example, on the
first day of the invasion and as Russian and Ukraine air forces battled over Kyiv, the PRC
Ambassador to Ukraine publicly announced that PRC was organizing an aerial evacuation of
Chinese citizens. Although the PRC eventually shifted to an overland evacuation of its citizens
once the reality of the conflict became apparent to PRC officials, the PRC’s initial reaction is
indicative of the PRC’s continued struggles to anticipate geopolitical risks and protect its overseas
interests.
As Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine has continued, Beijing has increasingly sought to balance
its strategic partnership with Russia while avoiding the reputational or economic costs that would
result from providing undeniable offensive material or “lethal” assistance to Russia. PRC leaders
and officials have parroted Russian narratives blaming the U.S. and NATO for causing the conflict.
Beijing has also refrained from directly criticizing or condemning Russia for using military force
to infringe on Ukraine’s sovereignty despite Russia’s actions in Ukraine violating the PRC’s Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Of note, Beijing has also become a willing buyer of Russian
energy exports to buoy Russia’s sanctioned-battered economy and has ensured Russia’s continued
diplomatic participation in multilateral organizations. At the same time, Beijing probably has taken
a discreet, flexible, and cautious approach to providing material support to Russia to enable the
PRC to maintain plausible deniability, control material transfers, create off-ramps to renege on
agreements, and maximize the PRC’s options to aid Russia. It remains to be seen whether/when
Russia becomes more of a liability than an asset in the Chinese calculus.
● To date, Chinese officials have publicly denied providing any lethal assistance to Russia.
However, as Beijing deliberates the scale and scope of materiel commitments, it probably will
seek to balance its strategic partnership with Russia while avoiding reputational or economic
costs that could result from its assistance. Russian customs data revealed that Chinese
companies, including state-owned enterprises under the purview of Beijing, have sold civilian,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
dual-use, and some minor military items to Russian military end users, such as small arms,
spare parts, navigation equipment, and protective gear.
● China’s expansive and unregulated commercial drone market has allowed Russian defense
forces to routinely acquire small drones and dual-use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to
support their war in Ukraine. Between March 2022 and 2023, Chinese firms exported more
than $12 million worth of drones and drone components to Russia. Chinese-origin drones have
been employed by Russian forces for targeting, surveillance, and strike missions in Ukraine.
In August 2023, Beijing announced it would implement its first controls on the civilian and
dual-use drone market, as well as the sale of civilian-use counter-UAV systems, in response to
international speculation over Chinese drones’ use in Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine.
PRC leaders and officials have sought to deflect international criticism over Sino-Russian relations
and protect its international reputation by using high-level diplomatic engagements and messaging
emphasizing the PRC’s “neutral” role in the conflict. These efforts include Chinese officials
meeting with Ukrainian officials, announcing token humanitarian assistance, and calling for peace
talks without developing a specific, detailed plan to resolve the conflict. Similarly, the PRC’s
ambiguous public messaging about the potential use of nuclear weapons probably is also intended
to portray China as a responsible and peaceful great power. In November 2022, during German
Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing, Xi said that nuclear weapons must not be used, nuclear
wars should not be fought, and the international community should come together to prevent a
nuclear conflict in Eurasia. Xi’s repetition of the PRC’s stated stance on nuclear weapons as well
as his unwillingness to specifically condemn Russian nuclear threats, suggest that Xi probably was
focused on protecting China’s reputation rather than applying strong pressure to prevent Russia
from using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine.
Global Initiatives. Adding to this standard framework for talking points on Russia’s war of
aggression in Ukraine and other foreign policy issues, in April 2022, Xi announced the Global
Security Initiative (GSI) at the Bo’ao Forum. Echoing the previous year’s rollout of the Global
Development Initiative (GDI), Beijing has promoted GSI extensively and attempted to insert GSI
language into multilateral forums and documents. At the CCP’s 20 th Party Congress in October,
Xi further promoted GSI and GDI, emphasizing that realizing the “great rejuvenation of the
Chinese nation” required equal prioritization of both security and development. As of the end of
2022, however, Chinese officials had yet to clearly define how GSI would actually advance the
vague security goals it espouses, such as safeguarding “comprehensive” security and protecting
territorial integrity. International receptivity to GDI and GSI has been mixed so far; GDI’s links
to BRI has made the initiative more attractive to developing countries, while GSI’s vagueness and
implicit criticisms of the United States have made more countries hesitant to sign on to it.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
PRC EFFORTS TO PROMOTE GSI ABROAD
PRC state-run media outlets publish multiple articles daily aimed at promoting the GSI
abroad, including in English, Spanish, French, Russian, and other languages. These
reports frequently quote local voices as well as current and former PRC and non-PRC
government officials expressing support for GSI. Additionally, PRC diplomats publish
“signed articles,” promoting GSI in local newspapers all around the world. While some
foreign-language PRC media reports and “signed articles” are tailored to local audiences,
most reports emphasize four key themes: (1) GSI promotes world peace and shared
prosperity; (2) the West’s security framework is based on a hegemonic, Cold-War mindset
that leads to crises; (3) The “International Community” supports GSI, especially in Africa,
the Middle East, Latin America, parts of Asia; and (4) GSI represents “true
multilateralism.” Although these reports state that GSI “seeks concrete actions and
tangible results” they do not articulate a framework, mechanisms, list of “signatories,” or
other specifics about how and what GSI would do.
Military Diplomacy. The PRC’s willingness to engage in military diplomacy with other countries
varies considerably based on its perception of a country’s adherence to the PRC’s diplomatic
framework. For example, the PRC’s “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination” with
Russia entails a relatively high degree of military cooperation. Sino-Russian military cooperation
occurs in practical forms through exchanges of training, equipment, technology, high-level visits,
and other coordination mechanisms. For other strategic partnership countries, the PRC seeks to
leverage those relationships to reinforce the PRC’s systemic preferences and maintain stability in
Beijing’s favor. For countries with whom the PRC has not established strategic partnerships, such
as the United States, the PRC shapes its military cooperation along more minimalist principles of
conflict avoidance that emphasize “non-conflict” and “mutual respect.” From the PRC’s
perspective, these curtailed relationships at least serve its foreign policy objective by ensuring
stable relations with major powers.
Although the COVID-19 pandemic continued to constrain PRC’s military diplomacy in 2022, the
PLA increased its external, in-person high-level military visits compared to 2021 and maintained
close contact with the military leadership of neighboring countries. The PLA also relied on high-
level virtual bilateral meetings and multilateral engagements to supplement cancelled engagements
and maintain contacts with foreign militaries.
PRC Policy Towards the Pacific Islands. Since 2015, the PRC probably has viewed economic,
political, and policing engagement with the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) as an opportunity to
expand the PRC’s regional influence, press countries to switch diplomatic recognition to Beijing,
deepen security cooperation, and advance the PRC’s responsible great power narrative. Of note,
in late May and early June 2022, then PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi traveled to seven PICs,
including Fiji and the Solomon Islands, and sought to promote the expansion of Sino-PICs
relations. During his visits, Wang emphasized that the PRC would continue to pursue a “four-
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